Kaizo or “Reconstruction” was founded by Yamamoto Sanehiko (1885–1952) in April 1919 at the height of the Taisho democracy movement. In the wake of the Rice Riots of 1918, several new radical periodicals sprang up in response to the call by journalists and intellectuals for reconstruction and democratization in Japan. By providing a forum for socialist and Marxist ideas, Kaizo acquired a reputation as one of the most advanced journals of its day. Not only did Yamamoto open his columns to the leading socialists in Japan, but he also introduced his readers to new trends in Western thought. Among those Westerners who contributed to Kaizo along with Russell were Einstein, G. D. H. Cole and the birth control advocate, Margaret Sanger.

At Yamamoto’s request and for the generous sum of £100 per piece, Russell agreed to write one article for each of the eight months he was to be in the Far East. On receiving his first manuscript, “On Patriotism”, the editor was fulsome in his praise and eagerly assured Russell of the high esteem in which he was held by Young Japan. In a letter to Russell of 25 December 1920, Yamamoto thanked him for his second submission, “Prospects of Bolshevik Russia”, which was to appear in the February issue of Kaizo. He also informed Russell that he was thinking of publishing the eight articles in book form and that, if the government censors interfered, he would have it published outside the country. Although unable to deliver the promised articles while in the Far East, on his return to Europe Russell fulfilled his obligation. In total, he contributed fifteen essays to the journal during 1921–23.

In 1952, Yamamoto once more approached Russell. The editor, who was now working for the prevention of war, solicited Russell’s views on peace for publication in Kaizo.

The copy-text is the publication in Kaizo, 3, no. 2 (Feb. 1921): 1–14 (B&R C21.04), the only extant version.
In considering the prospects and probable development of the Bolsheviks in Russia, it is necessary to investigate, not so much what they would wish to do if they were unopposed, but rather what it will be possible for them to do in view of the hostility of the world in so far as it is controlled by capitalists. It is doubtful whether this hostility will continue to take the form of blockade and vicarious war, or whether it will be confined to more surreptitious methods. I think that both the internal and external development of Russia will be entirely different if there is peace and trade from what they will be if the blockade and the fighting continue.

To those who, like myself, are advocates of communism as an economic system, the important thing is that Russia should succeed in establishing a prosperous and happy communistic régime. We should deplore, not only the downfall of Russia under the pressure of external enemies, but also any outward success purchased at the cost of what Russia has come to stand for in the world. Russia is faced with a danger of spiritual defeat at least as great as the danger of national defeat. What hope is there of avoiding both?

Before attempting to answer this question, it is necessary to understand the present policy of the Bolsheviks and the stage by which it has developed.

There is no doubt that, at the time when they first acquired power, in November, 1917, the Bolsheviks were opposed to imperialism, nationalism, and militarism. In those days the world was still in the throes of the war, and the Russians hoped to end the war by a revolt of the proletariat everywhere against their capitalistic taskmasters who were driving them on to slaughter each other. This hope proved vain. The Germans did not make a revolution until they were defeated and internationally powerless; the victorious nations of the Entente were momentarily pleased with their governments, and in no mood to listen to revolutionary doctrines. Consequently, the Allies were able to stir up war against the Bolsheviks. They could not get their troops to fight with any vigour in a cause which the working-classes of all civilized countries held to be nefarious; but they were able to employ mercenaries—the Czecho-Slovaks, Koltchak, Denikin, Judenich, the Poles, and so on. Consequently the Bolsheviks were compelled to create a vast army, and to spend their energies on war instead of economic reconstruction.

From this unfortunate sluggishness on the part of the peoples of Europe and America, many very bad results have followed. First and foremost, Russia has not had a fair chance of developing a communist system, so that there is still no experimental evidence as to whether communism is or is not a good method of creating and controlling industry. Secondly, Russia has been subjected to appalling suffering as a result of the absence of imported commodities. There is a terrible dearth of rolling-
stock, a grave insufficiency of food in Petrograd and Moscow, an absence of medicines, sanitary appliances, disinfectants and anaesthetics, so that the combatting of typhus and other diseases has been extraordinarily difficult. There is discontent with the government both in town and country because it has nothing to give the peasants in exchange for food, and therefore obtains little food and that little with difficulty. The need of dealing with discontent leads the government to adopt several repressive measures, such as prohibiting all daily newspapers except the official organs of the communist party. And the need of repelling the attacks instigated by Entente governments has driven the Russians into militarism, and into what is in effect, though not in its original intention, a policy of Asiatic imperialism. Under these circumstances, it is difficult for the original spirit of communism to survive.

The external policy of Russia has at present a double orientation, towards Europe and towards Asia.

The policy of Russia towards Europe, like that of Europe towards Russia, is a somewhat vacillating resultant of two different tendencies. In the early days of Bolshevik power, Lenin by his personal authority succeeded in forcing the acceptance of the Brest-Litovsk peace, because he felt that Russia could not continue fighting. The Left Social Revolutionaries and many of the Bolsheviks regarded it as a surrender of principle to make peace with a capitalistic government. But at that time Russia was so weak and Lenin so strong that his view prevailed. At the same time, everything was done that could be done to promote revolution both in Germany and in the Entente countries. It was believed in Russia at that time that all Europe was on the verge of revolution. Even so late as last summer, when I was there, all except a few of the shrewdest leaders were persuaded that revolution was imminent in all capitalist countries. This belief is naturally combined with advocacy of an idealistic policy, which would sacrifice all other considerations to the spread of communism, and would make no important concessions for the sake of temporary peace with existing governments.

On the other hand, practical men, who desire to build up Russian industry, to bring contentment and prosperity to the people, and to show that communism is compatible with happiness, urge the absolute necessity of trade with industrial countries if transport conditions are to become normal or factories recover anything like their pre-war standard of output. These men, of whom Krassin may be regarded as typical, desire to make peace with the western democracies. Even if it should be only a temporary peace, it would be worth concluding, from their point of view, if it lasted long enough to secure the importation of locomotives and machinery in sufficient quantities to last for a few years. These men are willing to make great concessions as regards Asiatic propaganda and propaganda in west-
ern countries, if thereby they can secure the restoration of normal commercial relations.

It is of course obvious that everything that increases Russia’s strength or gives hope of division among Russia’s enemies strengthens the hands of the less conciliatory party, while, on the other hand, ill success against the Poles or Wrangel, or any other circumstance tending to weaken Russia, tends to give the upper hand to those who seek peace with the west. Hence Russian policy is somewhat fluctuating and uncertain, according as conditions favour one or other faction in the Communist Party.

An exactly analogous division of opinion exists in England among those who control policy. Practical men like Lloyd George see that the Bolsheviks can damage us in India, and that it would be advantageous to get corn and other agricultural produce from Russia as we did before the war. They therefore advocate peace and trade. On the other hand, fanatical idealists of the older order, such as Churchill and Curzon, find the thought of peace with the Bolsheviks utterly abhorrent. Rather than undergo such a sacrifice of principle, they would rehabilitate Germany both in an industrial and a military sense, if only Germany would undertake to fight the Bolsheviks. Unfortunately, it is the Poles whom the Germans hate, not the Russians. Meanwhile the French remain obstinately determined to continue punishing the Russians and the Germans simultaneously—the Russians for repudiating their debts to the French bondholders, and the Germans for being Germans. Amid these difficulties and conflict, English policy in the Russian trade negotiations remains vacillating. When Lloyd George appears on the point of concluding peace, the Navy, under Churchill’s orders, starts a naval war against Russia in the Black Sea, or Curzon sends an insulting note about Persia. The result of the conflict of opinion on both sides is that the negotiations drag on, and up to the present time (December, 1920) no agreement has been reached.

As time goes on, the Asiatic policy of the Bolsheviks becomes increasingly important, and dominates more and more their relations to other powers. In early days, the Bolsheviks had their eyes fixed on the west, and thought little about Asia. They believed that the moment had arrived for the social revolution foretold by Marx, and that it must quickly spread from Russia to western Europe. But with the failure of this hope there has come an increasing need to acquire military strength by ordinary means, to be as strong as imperialist Britain, and to be able to terrify nations which have proved impervious to propaganda. The necessity of defeating Koltchak and the Czech-Slovaks involved the reconquest of Siberia; they and the other enemies incited by the Entente compelled the creation of a very powerful army. In countries like Turkestan and Bokhara, where the land belonged to large landowners, they were dispossessed by the Red Army, and the small proprietors who were created were naturally friendly
to the Bolsheviks. Throughout western and central Asia, the Bolsheviks have known how to secure the friendship of the populations by applying only such portions of their creed as would be popular. They have allowed the natives a far greater share of local administration than they had in Tsarist times; they have not favoured Christianity as compared with Mohammedanism; they have been more just and less corrupt than the old officials.

The Bolsheviks have now recovered practically the whole of the former Asiatic territory of Russia.—Some of it is autonomous and only federated to Moscow; but through the discipline of the communist party, this gives Moscow all the control that is necessary so long as communists are in power in the autonomous regions. But even where communists are in power, little attempt is made to establish communism, which is considered (rightly, as I think) unsuited to such backward communities as those of Central Asia.

Outside the boundaries of the former Russian Empire, the departure from communism is more complete and more openly avowed. In theses presented to the Second Congress of the Third International (July, 1920), Lenin says:

"We cannot therefore any longer confine ourselves to recognizing and proclaiming the union of the workers of all countries. It is henceforth necessary to pursue the realization of the strictest union of all the national and colonial movements of emancipation with Soviet Russia, by giving to this union forms corresponding to the degree of evolution of the proletarian movement among the proletariat of each country, or of the democratic-bourgeois movement of emancipation among the workers and peasants of backward countries or backward nationalities.

"The Communist International," he says in the same work, "must conclude temporary alliances with the bourgeois democracy of backward countries but must never fuse with it."

Under the shelter of this formula, it is possible for the Bolsheviks to cooperate with rich nationalists in Turkey, Persia or India, without being obliged to terrify them by the threat that their property will be confiscated. But in fact, obviously, any success of nationalist movements in these regions, if obtained with Bolshevik help, would constitute an extension of Bolshevik power and growth of their Empire. The leading Bolsheviks are undoubtedly men in whom a genuine internationalism is very strong; this is true, in particular, of Lenin. I have no doubt that, if Lenin had to choose between the success of communism and the prosperity of Russia, he would choose the success of communism; and it is admitted by his
enemies that he would sacrifice himself without a moment’s hesitation. But Lenin is not the whole of the Russian government, any more than Lloyd George is the whole of the British government. As the Bolsheviks become more firmly established they receive, more and more, the cooperation of men whose real sympathies are not with them. There are in the army now a great number of Tsarist officers; there are in industry many men who were technical experts or contractors under the ancien régime and whose whole outlook is still capitalistic. Above all there is the inevitable tendency of the international situation to revive imperialism in a nation accustomed to empire. For all these reasons it is difficult to feel any certainty that the future foreign policy of Russia will not be one of Asiatic conquest.

It is an odd fact that revolutions, after the first moment, make very little difference to the foreign policy of the government. In the seventeenth century, when England was the revolutionary country, the foreign policy of Cromwell was just the same as that of Charles II: alliance with France against Spain and Holland. In the eighteenth century, the foreign policy of Louis XIV, XV and XVI was continued by the French revolutionaries and Napoleon. And now, in Bolshevik Russia, there is a tendency to revert to the foreign policy which was pursued by the Tsardom before the German menace overshadowed everything else. Down to the year 1907, Tsarist policy was one of Asiatic expansion in opposition to England and Japan. The phrases have been changed by the coming of the Bolsheviks, and the facts could have been changed if England and Japan had not shown such implacable hostility to the revolutionary government of Russia. But as this government has been obliged to fight for its life, and has fought with extraordinary success, it has gradually been driven, by the inevitable momentum of war, to the very verge of a policy of disguised conquest, which is in effect the old Tsarist policy, and has the immense advantage of being the natural policy from the standpoint of nationalist instinct.

The question whether the Russians will be driven to a complete adoption of the policy of Asiatic conquest is a very momentous one for the history of the world. The question whether it is adopted or not turns entirely, to my mind, upon the question whether the Powers consent at an early date to peace and trade with Russia. I do not know of any issue more momentous in the politics of the last hundred years. Let us try, as far as we can, to conjecture the results of the two policies of peace and war with Soviet Russia on the part of England and Japan.

If the Russians secure peace and trade, the effect upon their home policy and their whole outlook will be very far-reaching. To begin with, they will be able to restore transport to its pre-war condition. Next, they will be able to offer the peasants clothes and agricultural machinery in return for the food needed by the towns and the army. This will at once allay the
discontent of the peasants, who in any case owe their land to the Bolshevists and fear that the victory of reaction might deprive them of it. It will thus regenerate Russian agriculture, and produce an adequate supply of food and more commodities in the towns. This will make it possible for the Bolshevists to regain their popularity with the industrial section of the population. Neither the peasants nor the townspeople, for the most part, have any objection to the communist government or principle, but they are uncomfortable owing to the blockade, and they attribute their lack of comfort mistakenly to the government. If the government can give them comfort, they will cease to dislike it.

If the communist government feels itself popular in Russia, it will relax very many of the restrictions on liberty which it at present imposes. If it is not driven by desperate poverty, it will do great things for education. If it has trade with foreign nations, and the intercourse which must accompany trade, it will become more conscious of and sensitive to foreign public opinion. The atmosphere of group-fanaticism, which is inevitably created by desperate national enterprise, will be dissipated. It is possible that Russian communism, under such circumstances, may lose some of the fiery quality which forms its attraction to many temperaments; but it will become more practical, it will have a chance to show what communism is capable of technically as a method of production, and it will, if it succeeds, be able to appeal to men’s reason and not only to their emotions and to their desperate need of hope. The industrial nations may then be able to learn from Russia, not only to acquire from Russia certain revolutionary ferment. And in that case it is possible that the transition to communism, which is inevitable sooner or later, may take place without too terrible a world-cataclysm, while in Russia itself the attempt to restrict small retail trading by law, which now requires a great apparatus of police and spies and prisons, may be abandoned, and replaced by a policy of making the Soviet stores more attractive than the private shops. For communism cannot be considered a success until it ceases to require a drastic legal suppression of the instincts of ordinary people.

If, on the other hand, the Powers continue to blockade Russia and to incite neighbouring nations and casual adventurers to attack the Soviet government, then a very different development is inevitable. This development has already gone a considerable distance, but it is contrary to the original spirit of Bolshevism, and would, I feel convinced, be readily dropped in return for peace and trade.

The Bolshevists control that vast plain, stretching over eastern Europe and northern Asia, out of which has come many of the great conquerors of the world. Genghis Khan emerged from the same region, and acquired an empire which the Russians may possibly be compelled to surpass in the mere struggle for self-preservation. Bolshevism, on its Asiatic side, is not
unlike Mohammedanism, and may inspire similar spirit. The whole effect of the hostility of the western democracies is to emphasize its Asiatic side, and to make, therefore, more and more calculated to produce one of these great upheavals by which Asia from time to time astonishes and terrifies Europe.

It is clear, I think, that this is not what Bolsheviks most desire. What they most desire is that Russia should become an industrial country as similar as possible to the United States, except that there would be great functionaries instead of great millionaires, and the rewards of industrial skill would take the form of power rather than wealth. The Bolsheviks have an ideal of society which they would like to realize; it depends upon industrialism, and cannot be realized immediately except in industrial countries. Almost all the men in the Soviet government are men who have been compelled to spend long years of exile in western countries, and have acquired during those years a taste for western outlook and method. It is not by their choice or desire that they have turned so much of their attention eastward; it is because the west has refused intercourse with them. They had no wish to devote their attention to military problems, but they were compelled nevertheless to create a great army, and so long as peace is refused they are obliged to use their army and their skill in propaganda for further conquest, since that is the only way by which they can avoid disaster.

From the imperialist and nationalist point of view, nations such as Japan and England, which have territory on the continent of Asia and immense interests in China, are insanely foolish in forcing the Russians, against their will, to create such a vast hostile force, both spiritual and material. It is not too late to make peace, but it is far too late to hope for military victory. If we continue to fight Russia, Russia is most certain, before many years have passed, to overrun or federate with every part of Asia, except those few that can be controlled by naval force.

Such a result would of course be disastrous to Japan and England from the point of view of their nationalist ambitions and their trade; it would in fact mean their downfall as great Powers. It would also be disastrous to Bolshevism considered as an idealistic movement from which help may come to a degraded and tortured world. It is obvious that the side of Bolshevism which makes it attractive to all who desire a better social order would infallibly be lost as a result of Asiatic conquest and consequent wealth and power. Communism would sink into the background, as an ideal of which the realization must be postponed. This kind of process is familiar to history in the case of Christianity which also was communist in its infancy, but condemned communism as a heresy when it became rich and powerful.
There is, it is true, another side to the picture. It would make for the peace of the world if all Asia were combined into one Power, since it would be a Power weak in attack but invincible in defence. It is possible, though far from certain, that India might have more freedom than at present; and it is possible that the regeneration of China might be accelerated. Moreover, England would certainly be rendered more liberal by loss of empire, and would be very likely to adopt communism just as Russia ceased to practise it. But such an empire would probably be closed to western influences, unindustrial, and with a diminishing level of civilization. Being unindustrial, it could not be communistic in any modern sense; it would consist in the main of peasant proprietors governed by a small class of rulers. It might be internally happy and externally unaggressive, but it would contribute nothing new to the solution of the world’s difficulties. This would be a poor outcome of a movement which has inspired such high hopes as have centred round Russian Bolshevism.

The conclusion to which we seem to be forced is that, unless Russia can secure peace and trade very quickly, it will become impossible, for the present, to realize Bolshevik ideals in practice, because the Bolsheviks themselves will be inevitably led to abandon them in the course of conflict with capitalist Powers. It is quite probable that those Powers will be overthrown by their oppositions to Bolshevism. But if one must suppose (as sometimes seems unavoidable) that it is the good in Bolshevism which causes the governments to hate it, and that they are actuated less by self-interest than by a fanatical horror of communism and economic justice, then it is necessary to concede some measure of success to the opposition of the Churchills and Millerands. They will not succeed in securing the survival of the old, but they may succeed in preventing the new from being any better than the old. The Bolsheviks came into power the protagonists of the new ideals, bringing hope of a better world. By the necessity of fighting, they have been driven more to assimilate their régime, in many respects, to those against which they are contending. There is only one way of preserving what is valuable in Bolshevism, and eliminating what is less good, and that is the way of peace and trade. It is clearly therefore the duty of everyone who believes that common ownership of the means of production is the road of progress to do everything possible in the way of urging peace upon the governments of Russia and the Entente. Continued conflict may give nominal victory to the one side or to the other, but cannot give the victory to any cause which a lover of mankind can value.
The Prospects of Bolshevik Russia

224: 26–7  Germans ... revolution ... defeated  The Allied forces had blunted the German offensive of 1918 and begun to advance at the second Battle of the Marne from mid-July to early August. With the Allied advance at the Argonne and Ypres, General Erich Ludendorff, the German commander in the field, called upon the Government on 29 September 1918 to seek an armistice before his armies collapsed. The shock of the news of defeats accelerated a democratic tide in Germany hostile to the Kaiser and Prussian military ascendancy. Naval mutinies in Kiel on 28 October 1918, followed by uprisings in much of northwest Germany, triggered revolution in Munich on 7 and 8 November and the Kaiser's abdication one day later. Philip Scheidemann, the Social Democratic leader, then proclaimed the Republic in Berlin.

The non-Bolshevik Moscow and provincial press was shut down in the summer of 1918, leaving Pravda, established in 1912 and banned during the war, and Izvestiya, established by the Petrograd Soviet early in March 1917, as the only officially sanctioned Russian dailies. Lenin also nationalized publishing houses and printing presses, so that between 1920 and 1921 the Soviet state came to monopolize the production and sale of all books and other printed materials.

Along with France and Britain, both the United States and Japan committed troops and other resources to the White armies in the Civil War. In the summer of 1918 the British landed forces at Murmansk and, with the French, at Archangel in November. The British and the French also exploited President Wilson’s support for the Czechoslovak’s uprising in Siberia to persuade him to approve American intervention against the Bolsheviks in northern Russia. All of these Allied troops had been withdrawn by the autumn of 1919 but, in an effort to secure dominance in Siberia, the Japanese had occupied Vladivostok at the end of December 1917 and remained there for nearly four years (see A278: 25).

The German peace terms that were received by the Communist Party Central Committee on 23 February 1918 were so draconian that many leaders wanted to fight on. Lenin argued that, with no revolutionary army, continuance of the conflict meant the death sentence for the Soviet Government. This argument, coupled with Lenin’s threat to resign, won a bare majority to his side. A few leading Bolsheviks, including Nikolay Bukharin and Karl Radek, still voted against Lenin, and his proposal for acceptance was only carried when Trotsky agreed to abstain. These same arguments, delivered eloquently, led majorities in the Petrograd Soviet and the Central Executive Committee of the Congress of Soviets to endorse the decision of the Communist Party Central Committee. When a special Soviet Congress met a fortnight after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed on 3 March 1918, the Left Socialist Revolutionaries, having been outvoted by Lenin’s supporters, left the Government, refusing to be bound by the Treaty.

In the summer of 1919, Grigory Zinoviev (1883–1936), Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, boasted that “in a year all Europe shall be Communist” (Pipes 1994: 175), and at the height of the Polish war in July 1920, Lenin cabled Stalin to call not only for the sovietizing of Poland but also for a general revolutionary offensive against the West.

Leonid Borisovich Krassin (1870–1926) was a successful Soviet trade negotiator and diplomat. He led the Delegation of the People’s Commissariat of Trade and Industry that negotiated the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement from early July 1920 to 16 March 1921 and was Ambassador to Great Britain when he died.

Baron Pyotr Nikolayevich Wrangel (1878–1928) was the Gen-
eral who led the White armies in the last stages of the Civil War and who evacuated large numbers of troops from the Crimea through Constantinople in November 1919.

226: 11–13 Lloyd George ... India ... agricultural On 13 November, 1919 in the House of Commons, Lloyd George criticized the blockade, noting that Russia was “one of the great resources for the supply of food and raw material” (United Kingdom 1919, 474). Responding to critics on 17 November, he summoned up the memory of Lord Beaconsfield (Disraeli) who had seen Russia as “a great, gigantic, colossal” power “rolling onward like a glacier towards ... India as the greatest menace the British Empire could be confronted with” (United Kingdom 1919, 723).

226: 14–17 fanatical idealists ... Churchill and Curzon ... Germany The most implacable foe of the Bolsheviks within the Cabinet, Churchill described them in a speech to his constituents on 26 November 1918 as “ferocious baboons” who “hop and caper ... amid the ruins of cities and the corpses of their victims” (quoted in Gilbert 1975, 227). To the Prime Minister, who wanted reconciliation with the Soviets, Churchill wrote on 10 April 1919: “Feed Germany; fight Bolshevism; make Germany fight Bolshevism” (ibid., 277). Churchill was forced both by Lloyd George and the collapse of the Whites to abandon his crusade against the Bolsheviks. George Nathaniel Curzon (1859–1925), created Earl Curzon of Kedleston in 1911, Marquess in 1921, Viceroy of India 1898–1905 and Foreign Secretary 1919–24, was a traditional British imperialist and Conservative who feared Bolshevism as a threat to Britain’s hold on India and influence in Persia, although he sometimes regarded the White armies as equally dangerous. Curzon also agreed with Lloyd George that European recovery and stability depended on the restoration of Germany; hence he opposed France’s retributive treatment of their former enemy.

226: 22 Russians for repudiating their debts To cement the Franco-Russian Alliance negotiated between 1891 and 1894 and to help stabilize the Tsarist regime, France loaned to Russia, mainly through State bonds, some twenty-four billion francs (about five billion American dollars) both in the two decades before, and after the coming of war in 1914. French creditors were owed forty-three percent of the total Russian debt repudiated by the Bolsheviks on 28 January 1918. This repudiation incurred the wrath not merely of France’s wealthy financiers, for seventy-five percent of the French debt was owed to more than a million often petit bourgeois or peasant bond holders. Russell fumigated to Colette on 24 December 1920 that “France〈was〉encouraging every imaginable villain in Poland in order to punish the Bolsheviks for repudiating Tsarist debts”. Britain, by contrast, held thirty-three percent of Russia’s debt, but about three quarters of this sum was owed to the Government.

226: 26–7 Churchill’s orders ... naval war against Russia ... Black Sea Russell is perhaps alluding to Churchill’s efforts in public speeches, throughout 1919 and early 1920, to persuade Lloyd George and the whole Allied Supreme
Command to undertake major armed intervention in Russia on behalf of the White armies. Lloyd George, however, was convinced by early 1919 that intervention against the Bolsheviks was detrimental to British interests, especially to the reopening of trade relations with Russia. This view was articulated forcefully by the Prime Minister in his Guildhall speech of 8 November 1919, where he argued for a reversal of the British policy of attempting to crush Bolshevism. Churchill then joined with The Times and other right-wing elements in opposing reconciliation with Lenin’s Russia. In a speech at Sunderland on 3 January 1920, in which he depicted Bolshevism as imperilling the Empire in many parts of the world, he referred specifically to the Black Sea region, where a “junction of Russian Bolshevism and Turkish Mahommedanism would be full of danger … to none more than the British Empire …” (The Times, 5 Jan. 1920, p. 7).

Curzon sends an insulting note about Persia In a letter to Foreign Commissar Chicherin, published in The Times on 9 October 1920, Curzon launched into a general indictment of Soviet foreign policy, alleging, for example, that the Bolshevik Government “has continued to send, and is at this moment sending Russian troops to Persia ...” (p. 11). This rebuke elaborated on part of a dispatch which Curzon had sent on 1 October 1920 to Trade Commissar Krasin, demanding that all remaining British prisoners in Russia be released before a trade agreement could be negotiated.

like Turkestan and Bokhara Their victory in the Civil War and the end of the Polish conflict allowed the Soviets to shift the weight of their policy to the Eastern borderlands. This was symbolized by the Congress of Eastern, mainly Moslem, peoples at Baku in September 1920. The gathering was to initiate a crusade of Eastern nations against Western imperialism. Since the White armies in these areas had been anxious to restore the old system of land tenure, the Moslem peoples were more disposed by 1920 to accede to Soviet guidance. This compliance was also a result of the autonomy that, however limited in fact, was granted both to Turkestan as a whole and to the enclave of Bokhara. The largest city in the region after Tashkent, Bokhara had been governed by a despotic Amir who was driven out and superseded by an embryonic Bokharan Communist Party. Since Bokhara had never been formally incorporated into the Tsarist Empire, the Soviet Government proceeded more slowly in integrating this “allied republic” than in Turkestan, an “autonomous republic”. Moscow’s promises of land distribution, political equality and religious toleration remained largely unfulfilled. Such policies conflicted with the interests of the Russian colonists on whom Soviet authority in the Eastern borderlands largely rested, although a limited recognition of the many local languages and other concessions to the Moslems were granted. In 1921 there was a famine and a serious uprising in Turkestan.

Lenin says ... same work ... fuse with it” Lenin uses the same quotations from Communist International 1920 in Paper 35, p. 195.

Bolsheviks to cooperate ... in Turkey, Persia or India In Turkey,
the nationalist leader Mustafa Kemal (1881–1938) had led a revolution to modernize his country and found outside support nowhere but in Soviet Russia. Kemal’s overtures to Moscow in June 1920 had found a ready response. After months of negotiations, a Turco-Soviet “Treaty of Friendship and Brotherhood” was concluded on 16 March 1921. The Anglo-Persian Treaty signed on 9 August 1919 irritated both Persian nationalists and the Bolsheviks. To undermine this “colonial” agreement, the Soviet Government instructed the Persian Communist Party to disavow revolution until there had been full bourgeois development. This policy allowed the rising middle class Persian leaders by October 1920 to seek an arrangement with the Bolsheviks that would displace foreign capitalists. Later in October a Persian representative arrived in Moscow to begin negotiations for what became a Soviet-Persian Treaty on 26 February 1921. A number of Indian delegates had been present at the Second Congress of the Comintern (July–August 1920), which debated the “national and colonial question”. Some, led by the founder of the Communist Party of India, M. N. Roy, actually criticized Lenin’s advocacy of temporary alliances between Communists and “democratic-bourgeois” nationalists, favouring instead the creation of communist organizations of workers and peasants. Other Indians who attended the subsequent “First Congress of the Peoples of the East” at Baku (September 1920) were less interested in building a mass movement than in obtaining Russian political and military support for armed struggle against British rule. See also A195: 28–9.

228: 6 great number of Tsarist officers The necessity for a huge army to confront first the Germans and then the White forces meant that the Bolsheviks had no alternative but to draft many thousands of ex-Imperial officers who were considered overtly hostile to the regime. The vast majority, however, acted professionally and were instrumental in the Bolshevik victory in the Civil War.

228: 16 Cromwell … Charles II: alliance with France Although Oliver Cromwell as Lord Protector (1653–58) allied England with France, he never accepted French money or the near-client status to which Charles II (1630–85), King of Great Britain and Ireland (1660–85), seemed prepared to accede by the secret Treaty of Dover of 1670.

228: 17–19 foreign policy of Louis … Napoleon Both the Bourbon kings and Napoleon, through war, marriages and diplomacy, attempted to extend France’s direct authority to her “natural” frontiers—the Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees, while exercising control through puppet leaders of the Low Countries and Spain.

228: 21 Down to the year 1907 Negotiated in 1907, the Anglo-Russian Entente settled major imperial disputes between the two countries in Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet. The agreement also laid the basis for collaboration in Europe between Britain, France and Russia in what developed into the Triple Entente.

228: 24–5 England and Japan had not shown such implacable hostility See A225: 9–10.
On the eve of the Revolution, the peasantry owned nine-tenths of the Russian Empire’s arable land, but great tensions still existed in rural society, for most of this land was controlled by a mere twenty percent of the peasantry. The land reforms of Pyotr Arkadyevich Stolypin (1862–1911), Prime Minister (1906–11), that had brought about this redistribution in favour of the self-supporting “middle peasants” and richer “kulaks” were intended to strengthen Tsarism but had in fact deepened peasant alienation. The Bolsheviks initially gained great support from among the poor or landless peasantry after Lenin issued a Land Decree on 7 November 1917 demanding the immediate partition of all major estates—those of aristocratic landlords, merchants and the richer kulaks. Then throughout 1919 poor peasants were appeased by the policy of “equalization”, which was intended to win their support during the Civil War but also led to the creation of uneconomic peasant holdings. Hence, just as Russell was publishing this article, the Government was forced to resort to extremely unpopular requisitioning of peasant grain stocks.

Genghis Khan (c.1162–1227) was a Mongolian warrior ruler who unified the tribes of Mongolia and then created an empire that at its height reached from China to the Adriatic Sea.

Alexandre Millerand (1859–1943) was originally elected to the French Chamber of Deputies as a socialist but moved to the Right in the various administrations in which he sat after becoming the first European socialist to serve in government in 1899. When Clemenceau was forced to resign early in 1920, Millerand formed a Cabinet in which as both Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs he directed most of his energy towards enforcing the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles against Germany and sending arms and supplies to Poland for the war against Russia.
41 The Prospects of Bolshevik Russia

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228:7–8 ancien régime] ancient regime CT