

My Religious Reminiscences [1938]

THIS PAPER WAS published first in *The Rationalist Annual* (1938): 3–8, which appeared in November 1937. The editors of *The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell* (1961) selected it for inclusion in that volume, and it was reprinted again in *Bertrand Russell on God and Religion* (1986), edited by Al Seckel. Since Russell was not involved in seeing the earlier of these books through the press, its text has no authority.

Russell had a long association with the Rationalist Press Association, as did his older brother, Frank, the second Earl Russell. Both lent their names, from 1928 until their deaths, as Honorary Associates, to the Association's masthead, and both contributed a number of articles to the RPA's various publications. In 1922 Bertrand Russell delivered the Conway Memorial Lecture, a highlight of the RPA's year; he chose as his topic, *Free Thought and Official Propaganda*, and the RPA brought it out as a little book later that year. In 1941 the RPA prevailed upon Russell to allow them to bring out a collection of his essays as a volume in "The Thinker's Library"; this little book was called *Let the People Think*. In 1954 Russell was elected President of the Rationalist Press Association, a position he held for several years.

In addition to the printed versions, the Russell Archives contains the manuscript and an uncorrected galley proof of its first publication. The manuscript (RAI 220.016580) has been selected as copy-text. The results of collating it with the printed version are reported in the Textual Notes.

MY PARENTS, LORD and Lady Amberley, were considered shocking in their day on account of their advanced opinions in politics, theology, and morals. When my mother died, in 1874, she was buried, without any religious ceremony, in the grounds of their house in the Wye Valley. My father intended to be buried there also, but when he died in 1876 his wishes were disregarded, and both were removed to the family vault at Chenies. By my father's will, my brother and I were to have been in the guardianship of two friends of his who shared his opinions, but the will was set aside and we were placed by the Court of Chancery in the care of my grandparents. My grandfather, the statesman, died in 1878, and it was his widow who decided the manner of my education. She was a Scotch Presbyterian, who gradually became a Unitarian. I was taken on alternate Sundays to the Parish Church and to the Presbyterian Church, while at home I was taught the tenets of Unitarianism. Eternal punishment and the literal truth of the Bible were not inculcated, and there was no Sabbatarianism beyond a suggestion of avoiding cards on Sunday for fear of shocking the servants. But in other respects morals were austere, and it was held to be certain that conscience, which is the voice of God, is an infallible guide in all practical perplexities.

My childhood was solitary, as my brother was seven years older than I was, and I was not sent to school. Consequently I had abundant leisure for reflection, and when I was about fourteen my thoughts turned to theology. During the four following years I rejected, successively, free will, immortality, and belief in God, and believed that I suffered much pain in the process, though when it was completed I found myself far happier than I had been while I remained in doubt. I think, in retrospect, that loneliness had much more to do with my unhappiness than theological difficulties; for throughout the whole time I never said a word about religion to any one, with the brief exception of an Agnostic tutor, who was soon sent away, presumably because he did not discourage my unorthodoxy.

What kept me silent was mainly the fear of ridicule. At the age of fourteen I became persuaded that the fundamental principle of ethics should be the promotion of human happiness, and at first this appeared to me so self-evident that I supposed it must be the universal opinion. Then I discovered, to my surprise, that it was a view regarded as unorthodox, and called utilitarianism. I announced, no doubt with a certain pleasure in the long word, that I was a utilitarian, but the announcement was received with ridicule. My grandmother, for a long time, missed no opportunity of ironically submitting ethical conundrums to me, and challenging me to solve them on utilitarian principles. To my surprise, I discovered, in preparing the Amberley Papers, that she had subjected an

uncle of mine, in his youth, to the same treatment on the same topic. The result in my case was a determination to keep my thoughts to myself; no doubt in his case it was similar. Ridicule, nominally amusing but really an expression of hostility, was the favourite weapon—the worst possible, short of actual cruelty, in dealing with young people. When I became interested in philosophy—a subject which, for some reason, was anathema—I was told that the whole subject could be summed up in the saying: “What is mind? no matter; What is matter? never mind.” At the fifteenth or sixteenth repetition of this remark it ceased to be amusing.

10 Nevertheless, on most topics, the atmosphere was liberal; for instance, Darwinism was accepted as a matter of course. I had at one time, when I was thirteen, a very orthodox Swiss tutor, who, in consequence of something I had said, stated with great earnestness: “If you are a Darwinian, I pity you, for one cannot be a Darwinian and a Christian at the same time.” I did not then believe in the incompatibility, but I was already clear that, if I had to choose, I would choose Darwin.

20 Until I went to Cambridge, I was almost wholly unaware of contemporary movements of thought. I was influenced by Darwin, and then by John Stuart Mill, but more than either by the study of dynamics; my outlook, in fact, was more appropriate to a seventeenth or eighteenth century Cartesian than to a post-Darwinian. It seemed to me that all the motions of matter were determined by physical laws, and that, in all likelihood, this was true of the human body as well as of other matter. Being passionately interested in religion, and unable to speak about it, I wrote down my thoughts in Greek letters, in a book which I headed “Greek exercises”, in which, to make concealment more complete, I adopted an original system of phonetic spelling. In this book, when I was fifteen, I wrote:

30 Taking free will first to consider, there is no clear dividing line between man and the protozoon. Therefore if we give free will to man, we must give it also to the protozoon. This is rather hard to do. Therefore unless we are willing to give free will to the protozoon, we must not give it to man. This, however, is possible, but it is difficult to imagine. If, as seems to me probable, protoplasm only came together in the ordinary course of nature, without any special Providence from God, then we and all animals are simply kept going by chemical forces and are nothing more wonderful than a tree (which no one pretends has free will), and if we had a good enough knowledge of the forces
40 acting on any one at any time, the motives pro and con, the constitution of his brain at any time, then we could tell exactly what he would do.

Until the age of eighteen, I continued to believe in a deist's God, because the First-Cause argument seemed to me irrefutable. Then, in John Stuart Mill's *Autobiography*, I found that James Mill had taught him the refutation of that argument, namely that it gives no answer to the question "Who made God?" It is curious that Mill should have had so much influence on me, for he was my father's and mother's close friend, and the source of many of their opinions, but I did not know this until a much later date. Without being aware that I was following in my father's footsteps, I read, before I went to Cambridge, Mill's *Logic* and *Political Economy*, and made elaborate notes in which I practised the art of expressing the gist of each paragraph in a single sentence. I was already interested in the principles of mathematics, and was profoundly dissatisfied with his assimilation of pure mathematics to empirical science—a view which is now universally abandoned. 10

Throughout adolescence, I read widely, but as I depended mainly on my grandfather's library, few of the books I read belonged to my own time. They were a curious collection. I remember, as having been important to me, Milman's *History of Christianity*, Gibbon, Comte, Dante, Machiavelli, Swift, and Carlyle; but above all Shelley—whom, however, though born in the same month as my grandfather, I did not find on his shelves. 20

It was only at Cambridge that I became aware of the modern world—I mean the world that was modern in the early nineties: Ibsen and Shaw, Flaubert and Pater, Walt Whitman, Nietzsche, etc. But I do not think any of these men had much influence on me, with the possible exception of Ibsen. The men who changed my opinions at that time were two: first McTaggart in one direction, and then, after I had become a Fellow, G. E. Moore in the opposite direction. McTaggart made me a Hegelian, and Moore caused me to revert to the opinions I had had before I went to Cambridge. Most of what I learnt at Cambridge had to be painfully unlearnt later; on the whole, what I had learnt for myself from being left alone in an old library had proved more solid. 30

The influence of German idealism in England has never gone much beyond the universities, but in them, when I was young, it was almost completely dominant. Green and Caird converted Oxford, and Bradley and Bosanquet—the leading British philosophers in the nineties—were more in agreement with Hegel than with any one else, though, for some reason unknown to me, they hardly ever mentioned him. In Cambridge, Henry Sidgwick still represented the Benthamite tradition, and James Ward was a Kantian, but the younger men—Stout, Mackenzie, and McTaggart—were, in varying degrees, Hegelians. 40

Very varying attitudes towards Christian dogma were compatible with acceptance of Hegel. In his philosophy, nothing is held to be quite true,

and nothing quite false; what can be uttered has only a limited truth, and, since men must talk, we cannot blame them for not speaking the whole truth and nothing but the truth. The best we can do, according to Bradley, is to say things that are “not intellectually corrigible”—further progress is only possible through a synthesis of thought and feeling, which, when achieved, will lead to our saying nothing. Ideas have degrees of truth, greater or less according to the stage at which they come in the dialectic. God has a good deal of truth, since He comes rather late in the dialectic; but He has not complete truth, since He is
 10 swallowed up in the Absolute Idea. The right wing among Hegelians emphasized the truth in the concept of God, the left wing the falsehood, and each wing was true to the Master. A German Hegelian, if he was taking orders, remembered how much truer the concept of God is than, e.g., that of gods; if he was becoming a civil servant, he remembered the even greater truth of the Absolute Idea, whose earthly copy was the Prussian State.

In England, teachers of philosophy who were Hegelians almost all belonged to the left wing. “Religion”, says Bradley, “is practical, and therefore still is dominated by the idea of the Good; and in the essence of this
 20 idea is contained an unsolved contradiction. Religion is still forced to maintain unreduced aspects, which, as such, cannot be united; and it exists, in short, by a kind of perpetual oscillation and compromise.” Neither Bradley nor Bosanquet believed in personal immortality. Mackenzie, while I was reading philosophy, stated in a paper which I heard that “a personal God is, in a sense, a contradiction in terms”; he was subsequently one of my examiners. The attitude of these men to religion was thus not one of which the orthodox could approve, but it was by no means one of hostility: they held religion to be an essential ingredient in the truth, and only defective when taken as the whole truth. The sort of
 30 view that I had previously held, “either there is a God or there is not, and probably the latter”, seemed to them very crude; the correct opinion, they would say, was that from one point of view there is a God and from another there is not, but from the highest point of view there neither is nor is not. Being myself naturally “crude”, I never succeeded in reaching this pitch of mellowness.

McTaggart, who dominated the philosophical outlook of my generation at Cambridge, was peculiar among Hegelians in various ways. He was more faithful than the others to the dialectic method, and would defend even its details. Unlike some of the school, he was definite in assert-
 40 ing certain things and denying others; he called himself an atheist, but firmly believed in personal immortality, of which he believed that he possessed a logical demonstration. He was four years senior to me, and in my first term was president of the Union. He and I were both so shy that

when, about a fortnight after I came up, he called on me, he had not the courage to come in and I had not the courage to ask him in, so that he remained in the doorway about five minutes. Soon, however, the conversation got onto philosophy, and his shyness ceased. I found that all I had thought about ethics and logic and metaphysics was considered to be refuted by an abstruse technique that completely baffled me; and by this same technique it was to be proved that I should live for ever. I found that the old thought this nonsense, but the young thought it good sense, so I determined to study it sympathetically, and for a time I more or less believed it. So, for a shorter time, did G. E. Moore. But he found the Hegelian philosophy inapplicable to tables and chairs, and I found it unworkable in mathematics; so with his help I climbed out of it, and back to common sense tempered by mathematical logic.

The intellectual temper of the nineties was very different from that of my father's youth: in some ways better, but in many ways worse. There was no longer, among the abler young men, any pre-occupation with the details of the Christian faith; they were almost all Agnostics, and not interested in discussions as to the divinity of Christ, or in the details of Biblical criticism. I remember a feeling of contempt when I learned that Henry Sidgwick as a young man, being desirous of knowing whether God exists, thought it necessary, as a first step, to learn Semitic languages, which seemed to me to show an insufficient sense of logical relevance. But I was willing, as were most of my friends, to listen to a metaphysical argument for or against God or immortality or free will; and it was only after acquiring a new logic that I ceased to think such arguments worth examining.

The non-academic heroes of the nineties—Ibsen, Strindberg, Nietzsche, and (for a time) Oscar Wilde—differed very greatly from those of the previous generation. The great men of the sixties were all “good” men: they were patient, painstaking, in favour of change only when a detailed and careful investigation had persuaded them that it was necessary in some particular respect. They advocated reforms, and in general their advocacy was successful, so that the world improved very fast; but their temper was not that of rebels. I do not mean that no great rebels existed; Marx and Dostoievsky, to mention only two, did most of their best work in the sixties. But these men were almost unknown among cultured people in their own day, and their influence belongs to a much later date. The men who commanded respect in England in the sixties—Darwin, Huxley, Herbert Spencer, Newman, the authors of *Essays and Reviews*, etc.—were not fundamentally at war with society; they could meet, as they did in the “Metaphysical Society”, to discuss urbanely whether there is a God. At the end they divided; and Sir Mountstuart Grant Duff, on being asked afterwards whether there is a God, replied:

“Yes, we had a very good majority.” In those days, democracy ruled even over Heaven.

But in the nineties young men desired something more sweeping and passionate, more bold and less bland. The impulse towards destruction and violence which has swept over the world began in the sphere of literature. Ibsen, Strindberg, and Nietzsche were angry men—not primarily angry about this or that, but just angry. And so they each found an outlook on life that justified anger. The young admired their passion, and found in it an outlet for their own feelings of revolt against parental authority. The assertion of freedom seemed sufficiently noble to justify violence; the violence duly ensued, but freedom was lost in the process.

3 My Religious Reminiscences

- 21: 8–9 **the guardianship of two friends ... shared his opinions** They were Thomas James Cobden-Sanderson (1840–1922), one of Russell’s godfathers (the other being John Stuart Mill), and later the founder of the Doves Press, noted for the superlative quality of its typography and design and production; and Douglas A. Spalding (1840–1877), a scientist who studied instinct in animals, particularly chickens, and who had joined the Amberley household as a tutor for Russell’s older brother, Frank. See Russell 1967, 17 (1967a, 10–11), for his account of the court proceedings.
- 21: 30 **an Agnostic tutor** This was John F. Ewen, whom Russell described as “an agnostic, and an acquaintance of (Edward) Aveling and Mrs. Aveling (Marx’s daughter). It was from him, in that connection, that I first heard of Marx. It was also from him, not in the same connection, that I first heard of non-Euclidean geometry. I liked him very much—more than any of my many tutors. I imagine he left because he was suspected of undermining my faith” (note appended to a letter from Ewen, 3 Jan. 1890).
- 21: 43–22: 1 **she had subjected an uncle of mine ... same topic** Amberley had two brothers, William and Rollo, one of whom is referred to here; Russell did not include their surviving papers in *The Amberley Papers* (1937).
- 22: 12 **a very orthodox Swiss tutor** It does not now seem possible to identify this person.
- 22: 26 **“Greek exercises”** Russell included a selection of these in his 1959; they have been published in their entirety in his 1983.
- 22: 29–42 **Taking free will first ... what he would do** Russell 1983, 6–7; Russell alters the punctuation considerably here.
- 23: 9–10 **Mill’s Logic and Political Economy** For his *Logic*, see A5: 28. The Bertrand Russell Archives includes seven sheets of notes on Mill’s *Logic* from Russell’s early days, but none on the other book.
- 23: 18 **Milman’s History of Christianity** Henry Hart Milman (1791–1868) was an English poet and historian. Russell is probably referring to *The History of Christianity from the Birth of Christ to the Abolition of Paganism in the Roman Empire* (1840); Milman also wrote *History of Latin Christianity* (1854–55) in six volumes. In “What Shall I Read?” (see A12: 13) he records re-reading Milman’s *History* during October 1892.
- 23: 18 **Gibbon** Edward Gibbon (1737–1794) is the author of *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (1776–88). Gibbon has nine entries in “What Shall I Read?” (See A12: 13.) During these sessions Russell finished

- reading *Decline and Fall*; the earlier parts were apparently read before he began keeping his list.
- 23: 18 **Comte** Isidore Auguste Marie François Comte (1798–1857) was the founder of positivism.
- 23: 18 **Dante** Alighieri (1265–1321) is the author of *The Divine Comedy*. During 1892 Russell read “Purgatorio” and “Paradiso”; presumably “Inferno” was read before he began keeping “What Shall I Read?”
- 23: 19 **Machiavelli** Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) was an Italian statesman and political philosopher; he is the author of *The Prince*.
- 23: 19 **Swift** Jonathan Swift (1667–1745) was the English satirist who wrote *Gulliver’s Travels* (1726). In “Disgust and Its Antidote” (1957c), one of a series of talks entitled “Books that Influenced Me in Youth” Russell tells of the enormous impact that Swift’s satires and science fiction had upon his imagination when he first encountered them at the age of fifteen. See Russell 1961a, 31–2.
- 23: 19 **Carlyle** During the period in which he recorded his reading, Russell noted that he had read five books by Thomas Carlyle (1795–1881). In his 1957d he informs us that earlier, in adolescence, he had read a great deal of Carlyle: “I thought his positive doctrines foolish, but his virulent denunciations delighted me. I enjoyed it when he described the population of England as ‘twenty-seven millions, mostly fools’” (Russell 1961b, 29). And in “My Mental Development” Russell wrote of his adolescence: “I read a great deal of Carlyle, and admired *Past and Present*, but not *Sartor Resartus*. ‘The Everlasting Yea’ seemed to me sentimental nonsense” (Schilpp 1944, 8).
- 23: 19 **Shelley** Percy Bysshe Shelley (1792–1822) was obviously a favourite of Russell; during the period of recorded-reading his name appears fourteen times; only Shakespeare (eighteen) and Turgenev (seventeen) score higher. In “The Importance of Shelley” (1957a), his first broadcast talk in “Books that Influenced Me in Youth”, Russell credits Shelley’s poetry with emancipating his imagination. “Here, I felt, was a kindred spirit, gifted as I never hoped to be with the power of finding words as beautiful as his thoughts” (Russell 1961a, 12).
- 23: 23 **Ibsen** Henrik Ibsen (1828–1906) was a Norwegian dramatist. During the period of “What Shall I Read?” Russell read Ibsen on thirteen occasions. In “Revolt in the Abstract” (1957b), another in the series “Books that Influenced Me in Youth”, Russell has a difficult time recalling the effect that Ibsen had on him, because he ceased to admire him later, after he came to realize that Ibsen’s view of revolt was essentially juvenile. Ibsen assumed a stable society within which his characters revolted against conventional morality: “This is all very fine if it is seen as the rare exception in a stable society. But when it is regarded as a general rule for everybody to follow it leads either to disaster or to the establishment of a tyranny in which only a few people at the top can, in Ibsen’s words, live their own life in their own way” (Russell 1961a, 25).

- 23: 23 **Shaw** Russell knew George Bernard Shaw (1856–1950) for over fifty years, but they were never close friends. “What Shall I Read?” records Shaw readings during three months. Russell thought that the Fabian Society, of which Shaw was one of the founders, had as its essence “the worship of the State”: it was this that led “Shaw into what I thought an undue tolerance of Mussolini and Hitler, and ultimately into a rather absurd adulation of the Soviet Government” (Russell 1967, 78; 1967a, 107).
- 23: 24 **Walt Whitman** Whitman (1819–1894) was an intimate friend of the Pearsall Smith family; so Alys introduced Russell to him during their visit to the United States in 1896. “The first place we visited was Walt Whitman’s house in Camden, N.J.; she had known him well, and I greatly admired him” (Schilpp 1944, 11).
- 23: 24 **Nietzsche** For an account of Russell’s opinion of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), see Paper 57.
- 23: 35 **Green** Thomas Hill Green (1836–1882) taught at Oxford from 1860 until his death; he was elected Whyte’s Professor of Moral Philosophy in 1878. Green was extraordinarily successful in persuading some of his ablest pupils that idealism was the philosophy most worth defending. His major writings were published only after his death. After reading Green’s ethical writings, Russell wrote an essay, “On the Foundations of Ethics”, for his first wife; it was published for the first time in his 1983.
- 23: 35 **Caird** Edward Caird (1835–1908) was a tutor at Oxford from 1864 until 1866 when he was elected Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow; in 1893 he returned to Oxford as Master of Balliol in succession to Benjamin Jowett, an office he held until his death. Although he was sympathetic to Hegel’s philosophy, his idealism was more strongly influenced by Kant, whom he regarded as his master, than by Hegel.
- 23: 35 **Bradley** Francis Herbert Bradley (1846–1924) developed his own distinctive version of idealism in a series of important books. His fellowship at Merton College required no teaching, so his influence was largely through his published writings. Russell paid a great deal of attention to Bradley’s writings, occasionally replying to them in print.
- 23: 36 **Bosanquet** Bernard Bosanquet (1848–1923) taught briefly at Oxford, but his influence came mainly through his books, especially his *Logic* (1888), which was assigned to pupils for some three decades. Russell read it as a student and admired it for a time, but his considered opinion of Bosanquet was not high. See Russell 1988, Papers 14 and 15, for two reviews of books by Bosanquet.
- 23: 39 **Henry Sidgwick** Sidgwick (1838–1900) was one of Russell’s teachers at Cambridge. Ethics was the subject in which he exerted most influence; his *Methods of Ethics* (1874) went through seven editions, and was read by nearly every philosophy student in Great Britain between 1874 and 1910.
- 23: 39–40 **James Ward** Ward (1843–1925) was also one of Russell’s teachers at

Cambridge; it was he who suggested to Russell that he write his fellowship dissertation on non-Euclidean geometry, since this topic combined both mathematics and philosophy, Russell's two areas of study at Cambridge.

- 23: 40 **Stout** George Frederick Stout (1860–1944) was also one of Russell's teachers at Cambridge. In a letter to John Wright of 5 June 1948 Russell had this to say of Stout: "As for Stout's philosophical views, the most significant thing I remember is his saying, after reading *Appearance and Reality*, that 'Bradley has done all that is humanly possible in ontology'. I got the general impression that he was Hegelian to the extent that Bradley was."
- 23: 40 **Mackenzie** John Stuart Mackenzie (1860–1935) was at Cambridge during the time Russell was a pupil, but Russell seems never to have had instruction from him, although, as he notes here, he was examined by Mackenzie. Mackenzie's interests in philosophy were largely confined to ethics and social philosophy.
- 24: 4 **"not intellectually corrigible"** Bradley 1893, 545; 1930, 483. "Still the difference drawn between absolute and finite truth must none the less be upheld. For the former, in a word, is not intellectually corrigible."
- 24: 18–22 **"Religion", says Bradley, "is practical, ... compromise."** Bradley 1893, 439–40; 1930, 389.
- 24: 25 **"a personal God is, in a sense, a contradiction in terms"** Not found in Mackenzie's early published works.
- 24: 40 **he called himself an atheist** In his last book, *The Nature of Existence* (1921, 1927) McTaggart argued that there is no God, either in the capacity of creator or controller. See his 1927, 185–6. This position is consistent with his earlier writings.
- 24: 41–2 **believed in personal immortality ... logical demonstration** McTaggart offered such a demonstration in his 1927, 187. In earlier writings he had only promised a demonstration.
- 25: 20–2 **Henry Sidgwick ... to learn Semitic languages** Sidgwick himself gives a different reason for the study of these languages: "In 1862 I was powerfully impressed by Renan's *Études d'Histoire Religieuse*, and derived from Renan's eloquent persuasions the conviction that it was impossible really to understand at first hand Christianity as a historical religion without penetrating more deeply the mind of the Hebrews and of the Semitic stock from which they sprang. This led to a very important and engrossing employment of a great part of my spare time in the study of Arabic and Hebrew" (Sidgwick 1906, 36–7).
- 25: 27 **Strindberg** August Strindberg (1849–1912) was a Swedish writer, now best known for his plays.
- 25: 28 **Oscar Wilde** Wilde (1856–1900) is famous for his wit, for his plays, and for his novel, *The Picture of Dorian Grey* (1891); he was a prominent member of the "aesthetic movement".
- 25: 35 **Marx** Karl Heinrich Marx (1818–1883) wrote and published the first

- volume of *Das Kapital* (1867) in the 1860s.
- 25: 35 **Dostoevsky** Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoevsky (1821–1881) wrote both *Crime and Punishment* (1866) and *The Idiot* (1868) during this decade.
- 25: 39 **Huxley** Thomas Henry Huxley (1825–1895) was a biologist who took up Darwin's theory of evolution when it was published in 1859 and wrote extensively in defense of it.
- 25: 39 **Newman** John Henry Newman (1801–1890) was an Anglican divine who was received into the Roman Catholic Church in 1845 and made a cardinal in 1879. During the 1860s he was engaged in defending his decision to become a Catholic.
- 25: 39–40 **the authors of *Essays and Reviews*** This famous exposition of liberal Christianity was published in 1860, and according to Evelyn Abbott, in his entry for Jowett in the *Dictionary of National Biography*, its publication “created a panic in the church”. Its authors were: Frederick Temple (1821–1902), later (1885–96) Bishop of London; Rowland Williams (1817–1870), who was prosecuted and suspended from his clerical duties for one year, but later re-instated; Henry Bristow Wilson, who suffered the same fate as Williams; Charles Wycliffe Goodwin (1817–1878), the only lay contributor; Mark Pattison (1813–1884), an Anglican divine who gradually became a sceptical deist, had a long and successful career as a teacher at Oxford; and Benjamin Jowett (1817–1893), then Regius Professor of Greek in the University of Oxford and later Master of Balliol College.
- 25: 41 **“Metaphysical Society”** This society was founded on 2 June 1869 and held monthly meetings until it was disbanded on 16 November 1880. Limited to a maximum membership of forty, it counted among its members most of the leading intellectuals and personalities in Great Britain, ranging from T. H. Huxley to Cardinal Manning (like Newman a convert to Catholicism) by way of Gladstone. A week before it met a paper would be circulated and discussion would centre upon it. If Grant Duff is to be taken literally, a proposition was proposed at the end summarizing the discussion and a vote taken.
- 25: 42–3 **Sir Mountstuart Grant Duff** Sir Mountstuart Elphinstone Grant Duff (1829–1906) was a leading Liberal member of Parliament from 1857 until he broke with Gladstone in 1881 over Home Rule for Ireland. From 1881 to 1886 he was Governor of Madras. He is perhaps best known for his diaries, which are a rich source of anecdote and social comment on the last decades of Victoria's reign.
- 26: 1 **“Yes, we had a very good majority.”** No source found.

3 My Religious Reminiscences

The manuscript (“CT”) consists of 12 leaves foliated 1–12, and measures 201 × 253 mm. It is written in ink. The textual notes contain a collation of CT with the published version in *The Rationalist Annual* (1938): 3–8 (“RA”).

- 21: 3 died, in 1874, CT] died in 1874 RA
 21: 4 buried, CT] buried RA
 21: 4 ceremony, CT] ceremony RA
 21: 6 when he died in 1876 CT] *inserted*
 21: 7 will, CT] will RA
 21: 27 while CT] *after deleted* during the previous time
 21: 29 difficulties; CT] difficulties, RA
 21: 30 about religion CT] *moved before* to any one
 21: 32 unorthodoxy RA] inorthodoxy CT
 21: 34 persuaded CT] convinced RA
 21: 37 unorthodox RA] inorthodox CT
 21: 40 ridicule CT] derision RA
 21: 40 grandmother, for a long time, CT] grandmother for a long time RA
 21: 41–2 challenging CT] *inserted after deleted* asking
 21: 42 To my CT] *after deleted* Oddly
 21: 42 surprise, CT] surprise RA
 22: 3 his case it CT] his it RA
 22: 5 people CT] *after deleted* children
 22: 8 “What is mind? no matter; What is matter? never mind.” CT] “What is mind?—No matter. What is matter?—Never mind.” RA

- 22: 10 Nevertheless, on most topics, CT]
 Nevertheless on most topics RA
- 22: 10 liberal; for CT] liberal. For RA
- 22: 13 had said RA] have said CT
- 22: 13–14 Darwinian, CT] Darwinian RA
- 22: 22–3 that, in all likelihood, CT] that
 in all likelihood RA
- 22: 24 religion, CT] religion RA
- 22: 25 letters, CT] letters RA
- 22: 30 Therefore CT] Therefore, RA] *Also*
at 22: 32.
- 22: 31 man, CT] man RA
- 22: 33 protozoon, CT] protozoon RA
- 22: 34 imagine. If CT] *altered from* imag-
 ine, if
- 22: 36 nature, CT] nature RA
- 23: 2 Then, CT] Then RA
- 23: 4 argument, namely CT] argument—
 namely, RA
- 23: 6 friend, CT] friend RA
- 23: 8 being aware CT] *inserted after deleted*
 knowing
- 23: 15 adolescence, CT] adolescence RA
- 23: 16 library, CT] library RA
- 23: 27 , after I had become a Fellow, CT]
inserted
- 23: 38 Cambridge, CT] Cambridge RA
- 23: 40 Kantian, CT] Kantian; RA
- 23: 41 varying CT] different RA
- 23: 43 philosophy, CT] philosophy RA
- 24: 25 terms”; CT] terms”: RA
- 24: 29 only defective CT] defective only
 RA
- 24: 35 mellowness CT] *after deleted* soph-
 istication
- 24: 40 certain CT] *above deleted* some
- 24: 41 believed CT] was convinced RA
- 25: 1 me, RA] me CT
- 25: 10 shorter CT] short RA
- 25: 12 unworkable CT] inapplicable RA
- 25: 36–7 among cultured people CT]
inserted
- 25: 39 Huxley, Herbert Spencer, Newman
 CT] Huxley, Newman RA